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Abstract 
Three studies explored the processes by which different types of shared 
resources were consumed by group members. Subjects shared physical, spatial, 
and temporal resources. The resources were arranged in either a partitioned or 
nonpartitioned form. Subjects did so with an implied withdrawal of either one-
third or one-twelfth and while participating in either a sharing or an accuracy 
instruction. Results for each resource provided partial support for a deliberate 
motive of greed and an inadvertent overestimation bias affecting subjects' 
withdrawals. The results also suggest that different types of resources may be 
consumed according to different criteria. Suggestions are made for 
methodological changes and further analyses which may increase support for the 
factors shown to affect people's resource consumption decisions. 
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When the Equality Rule is Violated: Factors Affecting 
the Consumption of Physical, Spatial, and Temporal Resources 
Most Americans are aware that our country is facing an energy crisis 
(Samuelson, 1990; Costanzo, Archer, Aronson, & Pettigrew, 1986). Although 
energy conservation appears to be one solution to the impending energy crisis 
(Samuelson, 1990), there is no apparent relationship between the general 
attitude held about conservation and personal conservation practices (Costanzo et 
al., 1986; Edney, 1980). One reason for the lack of this relationship is that 
people are less likely to conserve if they believe that the cause of a resource 
shortage is due to human actions as opposed to uncontrollable environmental 
factors (Rutte, Wilke, & Messick, 1987; Samuelson, Messick, Rutte, & Wilke, 
1984; Messick, Wilke, Brewer, Kramer, Zemke, & Lui, 1983; Olsen, 1981). A 
lack of personal responsibility, the anonymity of people's choices, a 
misconception that individual use has only a very minor effect on the world 
energy supply (Samuelson, 1990 ), and the delayed consequences of non-
conservative usage for self and society (Cross & Guyer, 1980; Platt, 1973) 
have developed the energy crisis into a "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968) 
in which the lack of individual conservation is threatening the future energy 
supply (Edney, 1980). In addition, failing to conserve resources not only 
depletes the total amount of resources available but also deprives others of their 
fair shares. 
Research on the social dilemmas surrounding energy conservation has 
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shown that while programs increasing communication (Messick &Brewer, 
1983), identifiability (Jorgenson & Papciak, 1981; Fox & Guyer, 1978; 
Bixenstine, Levitt, & Wilson, 1966), financial incentives (Komorita, Sweeney, 
& Kravitz, 1980; Bonacich, Shure, Kahan, & Meeker, 1976; Kelley & Grzelak, 
1972), public commitment (Pallack, Cook, & Sullivan, 1980), and group 
consciousness (Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Olsen, 1981; Edney, 1980; Brewer, 
1979) may slightly and temporarily increase conservation efforts, the benefits 
lessen over time or disappear altogether when the program is complete. One 
reason for this situation may be that personal comfort outweighs other factors 
when partaking of resources. A study that surveyed home energy use over a 
summer found that personal comfort outweighed efforts to conserve, monetary 
savings, and the role of the energy crisis in energy usage (Seligman, Kriss, 
Darley, Fazio, Becker, & Pryor, 1979). Edney (1980) points to the American 
system of democracy as one problem in the effort to conserve. The very system 
that ensures the right of free choice prohibits the government from 
implementing a forced conservation program to ensure that all people receive 
their fair share of resources. 
Social psychologists have long been interested in the decision making 
processes involved in resource sharing. Deutsch (1975), for example, focused 
on the topic of distributive justice. He argued that there exist circumstances 
where either equality, equity, or need is likely to be the prevalent factor in 
resource allocation. However, social cooperation is essential to justice and 
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concerns the individual well-being of group members. Furthermore, the 
applicability of social justice can only apply as far as group boundaries can be 
assessed, and, as Kramer & Brewer (1984) have shown, group identity can be 
perceived. Deutsch believes that just group relations depend heavily on group 
loyalty, mutual respect, personal equality, cooperation, and face to face contact. 
While Deutsch's description of distributive justice in group situations is 
valuable, there are many real world situations in which group identity and 
loyalty are not deciding factors in how decisions involving resources are made. 
In Messick and Sentis's (1979) study of a hypothetical work situation, one 
subject was responsible for deciding what fair and actual payments would be for 
his or her own and a hypothetical partner's payment. They found that the 
subjects favored equal monetary payments when their payments were set and 
they were deciding the other workers' payments, but favored higher, more 
egocentric payments when the others' payments were set and their payments 
were negotiable. Relating this finding back to Deutsch's ideas on group 
distributive justice, the other worker in this study was unknown, unseen, and 
not part of the subject's group or community, thus removing the worker from 
the subject's realm of social distributive justice. 
While social justice and group identification may play a role in decision 
making, McClintock and Allison (1989) identified individual differences that 
affect how subjects perform. After indentifying subjects as cooperaters, 
individualists, or competitors, they mailed a questionnaire asking them to 
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contribute their time to a worthy cause. The finding was that these individual 
differences did play a major role in decision making, with individuals classified 
as cooperaters donating twice as many hours as individuals classified as 
individualists and competitors. 
Another factor that influences the way in which resources are allocated is 
a social decision heuristic called the equality rule that is commonly implemented 
when group members learn they must share a common resource. The equality 
heuristic prescribes that people adopt an even division strategy (Rutte, Wilke, & 
Messick, 1987}. This heuristic is derived from the social norm of equality and 
provides people with a quick, efficient strategy by which to guide their own 
behavior as well as evaluate the behaviors of others. Harris and Joyce {1980) 
discovered that people often apply the equality heuristic mindlessly when making 
social choices. Messick (1992) calls equality the most prominent of all social 
decision heuristics. 
The equality heuristic tends to be more readily adopted in cases of greater 
identifiability and verifiability. Allison and Messick {1990) and Allison, 
McQueen, and Schaerfl (1992) designed their experiments so that subjects did 
not have the benefit of adopting the equality norm set by previous hypothetical 
subjects. In both of these experiments, the subject was the first person to 
withdraw from a shared physical resource, thus making the subject an 
identifiable norm setter. When the shared resources were partitioned or 
presented in an amount easily divisible by the number of members in the group, 
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subjects tended to adopt the equality rule because their withdrawals were also 
verifiable. In other conditions, when the resource was either nonpartitioned or 
not easily divisible, the equality rule was violated despite the identifiability due 
to the subject's position. Allison & Messick (1990) found that as they increased 
the temptations to violate the equality rule (e.g. higher payoffs), subjects' 
adherence to the rule dropped sharply, indicating that subjects are more likely to 
exhibit selfish behavior when the equality rule is only one of several choices and 
is not the most salient choice. 
Of particular interest, with respect to the proposed study, are the 
methodology employed and the trends uncovered by Allison, et al. (1992). In 
their first study, the experimenters varied the numbers of people in the 
subjects' groups (3 vs. 12) and the partitionment (partitioned vs. 
nonpartitioned) from which the subject withdrew. The amount of the resource 
was proportioned to the group size, so that if the equality rule was followed, all 
subjects would withdraw the same amount. They found that subjects who believed 
they were the first member in a group of 12 withdrawing from a nonpartitioned 
resource took over twice as much as subjects in the other three conditions. In 
the second study, when both the groups of 3 and 12 withdrew from both amounts 
of only the nonpartitioned resource, it was discovered that members of the larger 
group violated the equality rule based on group size rather than resource size. In 
a final study, Allison, et al. investigated whether or not the subjects' larger 
withdrawals were a function of a faulty perception of amounts by employing an 
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accuracy task. They found that when asked to withdraw accurately, subjects 
withdrew close to the requested amount but did slightly overestimate in the 12 
person group. In the resource sharing task when subjects were 1 of 3 
individuals sharing a resource, they tended to divide equally. Subjects in the 
group of 12, however, took almost three times their fair share. These results 
indicate that there are two processes guiding the actions of the subjects. The 
first is an unintentional overestimation bias exhibited when subjects are 
withdrawing from a large resource. The second is the appearance of deliberate 
greed. Subjects may believe that when withdrawing from a larger nonpartitioned 
resource, their greedy withdrawal will not be detected and that because they don't 
know their other group members, they are not subject to the distributive justice 
ideas set forth by Deutsch (1976). 
One of the shortcomings of prior research is that it has only addressed the 
question of how people share physical resources. Resources are not always 
physical, however, as people also share space and time. There exists a great body 
of research concerning the spatial and temporal variables which are included as 
the second and third resources under consideration in this paper. Previous 
research on temporal variables deals mainly with the conditions concerning its 
perception and overestimation (Loftus, Schooler, Boone, & Kline, 1987; Hogan, 
1978; Meade, 1966; Fraisse, 1984; Schiffman & Bobko, 1974; Sarason & 
Stoops, 1978). The research of a spatial nature is heavily concentrated on 
crowding and spatial density (O'Brien, 1990; Oldham, 1988; Pedersen, 1983; 
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Prerost, 1981; Lange, Mueller, & Donnerstein, 1979; McClelland & Auslander, 
1978; Jain, 1987}. It seems unfortunate that social psychologists have failed to 
explore the processes by which people share spatial and temporal resources. 
Time becomes a shared resource when people must decide how much phone or 
computer time they may use when others are also waiting their turns. 
Similarly, when people share land or air space they must decide how much of the 
space constitutes their fair share. Temporal and spatial resources would seem to 
be as common as physical resources and deserve to be included in the study of 
shared resources. 
In this experiment, the aforementioned shortcomings in the literature 
concerning resource sharing will be studied by including partitioned and 
nonpartitioned physical, spatial, and temporal resource in instructions of both 
resource sharing and accuracy while varying the fraction of equal withdrawal. 
Each resource will be subjected to the same methodological design but treated 
independently in the results. The research hypotheses are identical for each type 
of resource. It is predicted that an overestimation bias will be found when 
subjects withdraw from larger amounts of the nonpartitioned resource. In 
addition, greater withdrawals of the resource are expected when the verifiability 
of subjects' withdrawals are low (large group, nonpartitioned resource, sharing 
instruction} due to both an inadvertent overestimation bias and deliberate greed 
resulting in the violation of the equality rule. 
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Study 1 : Physical Resources 
The goal of Study 1 is to compare differences between withdrawals of 
physical resources as a function of fraction of equality (one-third, one-
twelfth)/group size (3 or 12), partitionment (partitioned or nonpartitioned), 
and type of instruction (resource or accuracy). It is expected that in the 
resource sharing instruction, subjects withdrawing from the partitioned 
resource will adopt the salient equality rule as will subjects withdrawing from 
the smaller, nonpartitioned resource. When withdrawing from the larger, 
nonpartitioned resource, a tendency to take more than one's fair share is expected 
due to an inadvertent overestimation bias and deliberate greed. The results of the 
accuracy instruction will likely show that the accurate withdrawal of a 
partitioned resource is quite easy but is hampered by overestimation when the 
resource is nonpartitioned and as the amount of the resource increases. 
Methods 
Subjects. Ninety introductory psychology students served as participants 
and received course credit for their participation. Each subject was randomly 
assigned to one of the eight conditions. 
Design. The experiment used a 2 (instruction: accuracy, resource 
sharing) X 2 (resource: partitioned, nonpartitioned) X 2 (equality fraction: 
one-third, one-twelfth) between subjects factorial design. Half of the subjects 
were told that they were participating in an accuracy of measurement task while 
the other half were told that they were participating in a resource sharing task. 
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In each of these instructions, half of the subject took from the partitioned 
resource (blocks) while half took from the nonpartitioned resource (sand). 
Finally, for half of the subjects in each of these conditions, the instructed or 
implied amount of the withdrawal was one-third while the instructed or implied 
amount of the other half's withdrawal was one-twelfth of their resource. 
Materials. The resource used in the partitioned resource condition of both 
the resource sharing and accuracy instructions was blocks. Six blocks were used 
in the one-third condition and 24 blocks were used in the one-twelfth condition. 
In the nonpartitioned resource conditions of both the resource sharing and 
accuracy instructions, the resource from which the subjects will withdraw was 
sand. Twenty-four pounds were used in the one-twelfth condition and 6 pounds 
were used in the one-third condition. Both the sand and the blocks were placed in 
an open rectangular box on a table in front of the subjects. Using their hands, the 
subjects placed their withdrawals in a separate box on the table next to the first 
box. 
A questionnaire assessed the subjects' understanding of their 
instructions, the amount of the resource that they believe they withdrew, and 
how much fun they had in this part of the experiment. The amount of fun was 
measured on a one to seven Likert scale with one indicating no fun at all and seven 
indicating a lot of fun. 
Procedure. Subjects were tested individually. Subjects in the accuracy 
condition were read instructions explaining that it is sometimes necessary to 
When the Equality 12 
estimate amounts accurately when the proper measuring tools are not available. 
The subjects withdrawing from the resource of 6 resource units (either 6 blocks 
or 6 pounds) were instructed to withdraw one-third of the resource. In the 
accuracy conditions where 24 units of the resource were present, the subjects 
were instructed to remove one-twelfth. Thus, subjects in all four conditions 
should have been accurately attempting to withdraw 2 units of their resource. In 
each of the four conditions, subjects were told that the subject withdrawing 
closest to the accurate amount would receive a $5 prize. In the partitioned 
accuracy conditions, one subject of those indicating the correct amount of time 
was chosen at random to receive the prize. 
Subjects in the resource sharing condition were introduced to the concept 
of resource sharing through real world examples of resource sharing. They were 
also told that they were the first member of a group of 3 (6 resource units) or 
12 (24 resource units) to withdraw from their particular resource and that the 
other group members would be withdrawing from the same resource after them. 
By telling subjects the number of members in their group and the total amount of 
the resource available to their group, it was implied that each member's fair 
share was 2 units (2 blocks or 2 pounds of sand) of the resource. Subjects were 
also told that one member of their group would be randomly selected at the end of 
the experiment and paid $2 for each entire pound or block and fraction of this 
amount in the nonpartitioned conditions for partial pounds of sand. In actuality, 
one subject in each of the resource sharing instructions was randomly selected 
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and paid $5. 
After the instructions were read, the experimenter answered any 
questions. Once the subject had begun the task, the experimenter did not answer 
questions. The subject then participated in the task. Upon the completion of the 
task, the subject was given and asked to complete the questionnaire. After the 
subject had finished the experiment, the number of blocks or the amount of sand 
withdrawn was recorded. Provided that the subject answered the items on the 
questionnaire concerning his or her understanding of the instruction correctly, 
the subject's data was analyzed. 
Dependent variables. The main dependent variables are the actual and 
perceived amounts of the sand or blocks withdrawn. The responses to the fun 
question were not used in this study. This question was designed specifically for 
Study 3 but was included on the questionnaires in each study to appear consistent. 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses were performed on the data to see if the order in 
which subjects were exposed to the three resources influenced their 
withdrawals. A 2 (partitionment: partitioned, nonpartitioned) X 2 (instruction: 
accuracy, sharing) X 2 (equality fraction: one-third, one-twelfth) X 3 (order: 
first, second, third) analysis of variance was performed on the perceived and 
actual physical resource withdrawals. This analysis failed to reveal any effects 
associated with order, indicating that subjects' withdrawal of the physical 
resource units was not affected by the position of the resource in the overall 
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experiment. 
A 2 (partitionment: partitioned, nonpartitioned) X 2 (instruction: 
accuracy, sharing) X 2 (equality fraction: one-third, one-twelfth} X .2. (type of 
withdrawal: perceived, actual) between subjects analysis of variance with 
repeated measures on the final variable failed to reveal the predicted 4-way 
interaction, E (1, 82} = .29, Q. = .59. The means for the experimental 
conditions are presented in Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
The overestimation bias appears in the accuracy instruction conditions where 
subjects perceived to take the correct amount in each equality fraction and 
partitionment condition but actually withdrew more when a large amount of the 
resource was presented in a nonpartitioned form. However, in the resource 
sharing instruction conditions, subjects not only perceived they took less of the 
resource in the one-twelfth, nonpartitioned condition than in the partitioned 
condition, they did indeed take almost an entire resource unit less. While 
subjects in the one-twelfth, nonpartitioned condition did overestimate their 
withdrawals, this overestimation is overshadowed by the unexpected low 
withdrawal in this condition. 
These findings support the existence of the overestimation bias but fail to 
uncover deliberate greed when the withdrawals are low in verifiability. 
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However, subjects sharing the larger, partitioned resource took one resource 
unit more than their fair share indicating deliberate greed in an unexpected 
condition. One possible reason for this is the ease with which subjects could 
withdraw the partitioned resource, blocks. Many of the subjects were not 
pleased that they were expected to withdraw the nonpartitioned resource, sand, 
with their hands. When presented with a large amount of sand, subjects' desire 
to keep their hands clean may have overriden the desire to dig in and possibly be 
compensated with the money. Conversely, the blocks were much easier to 
withdraw and the verifiability of the subjects' withdrawals may not have 
appeared to be as high as it was intended. The subjects were not told that their 
identity would be revealed to the next group member. 
The analyses did yield several significant results. The partitionment by 
equality fraction by type of withdrawal interaction (E (1, 82) = 4.28, p_ ~ .05) 
indicates that subjects both perceived they took and actually took virtually the 
same amount when the resource was in a small partitioned or nonpartitioned 
form. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
This was expected and is consistent with the findings of Allison, et al. (1992). 
When more of the resource was present, in the partitioned form the perceived 
and actual withdrawals were still equal but a greater amount had been taken. In 
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the nonpartitioned form, subjects actually took about the same as in the 
partitioned conditions but perceived that they had taken far less. The last finding 
is supportive of the overestimation bias. The means are presented in Table 2. 
This interaction is supported by an equality fraction by type of 
withdrawal interaction (£ (1, 82} = 4.28, Jl s .05) and a partitionment by type 
of withdrawal interaction, E (1, 82} = 4.42, J:2. s .05. Subjects perceived to take 
virtually the same amount in the one-third (M = 2.15, sd = . 71) and one-
twelfth (M = 2.14, sd = 1.17) equality fraction conditions and actually took that 
amount in the one-third condition (M = 2.15, sd = .77). Subjects actually took a 
mean of 2.61 resource units (sd = 1.56) in the one-twelfth condition, almost 
half a resource unit more than in each of the other conditions. This finding is 
somewhat supportive of the deliberate greed hypothesis but a look at the means 
displayed in Table 1 shows that subjects were only deliberately greedy in one of 
the four larger resource conditions. Figure 1 displays the interaction. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
In the partitionment by type of withdrawal interaction, subjects perceived they 
withdrew and actually withdrew the same amount in the partitioned condition (M 
= 2.39, sd = 1.15). They perceived they withdrew less of the resource in the 
nonpartitioned condition (M = 1.98, sd = .76), while they actually withdrew 
almost the same amount as in the partitioned condition (M = 2.35, sd = 1.27). 
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When the resource was nonpartitioned, estimating the withdrawal seems to have 
been more difficult than when subjects could count how many partitioned 
resource units they had withdrawn. The effect may be visualized in Figure 2. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
A main effect for type of withdrawal supports each of the significant 
interactions, E (1, 82} = 4.42, ll ~ .05. Subjects perceived that they withdrew 
a mean of 2.14 resource units (sd = .95} while they actually withdrew 2.37 
resource units (sd = 1.22}. Surprisingly, this effect in combination with a 
significant equality fraction by partitionment by instruction interaction (E (1, 
82) = 4.52, ll ~ .05) did not force the overall analysis to significance. The 
means for the equality fraction by partitionment by instruction interaction are 
presented in Table 3. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Separate analyses were also performed with the three independent variables on 
each type of withdrawal. The three-way interaction for the perceived 
withdrawal was significant (E (1, 82} = 4.08, Q. ~ .05} indicating that subjects 
had tried to take less than their fair share of the larger nonpartitioned resource. 
The three-way interaction on the actual withdrawal was found to be marginally 
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significant, E (1, 82) = 3.614, Jl = .06. The greatest actual withdrawals were 
found in the sharing partitioned and accuracy nonpartitioned conditions of the 
larger resource. The means in both the perceived and actual withdrawal 
interactions may be found in Table 1. 
Study 1 provides partial support for both the existence of the 
overestimation bias and deliberate greed. However, subjects' withdrawals may 
have been confounded by the desirability of the nonpartitioned resource and the 
degree of verifiability. 
Study 2: Spatial Resources 
The goal of Study 2 is similar to that of Study 1 but involves a spatial 
resource. This study will compare differences between withdrawals due to 
fraction of equality/group size and partitionment or nonpartitionment of a shared 
spatial resource to amounts withdrawn when accuracy is the instruction. The 
subjects will be placed into conditions varied by instruction, partitionment or 
nonpartitionment of the spatial resource, and fraction of equality. It is expected 
that in the resource sharing instruction, subjects withdrawing from the 
partitioned resource will adopt the salient equality rule as will subjects 
withdrawing from the smaller nonpartitioned resource. When withdrawing from 
the larger nonpartitioned resource, a tendency to take more than one's fair share 
is expected due to deliberate greed and an inadvertent overestimation bias. The 
results of the accuracy instruction will likely show that while the accurate 
withdrawal of partitioned resources is quite easy, it becomes more difficult due 
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to the overestimation bias when the resource is nonpartitioned and as the amount 
of the resource increases. 
Methods 
Subjects. The same 90 subjects used in Study 1 also served as 
participants for Study 2. The experimental conditions paralleled those of Study 
1 , and the subjects served in the same experimental conditions. 
Design. The experiment used the same design as found in Study 1, a 2 
(instruction: accuracy, resource sharing) X 2 (resource: partitioned, 
nonpartitioned) X 2 (equality fraction: one-third, one-twelfth) between 
subjects factorial design. Half of the subjects were told that they were 
participating in an accuracy of measurement task, while the other half were told 
that they were participating in a resource sharing task. In each of these 
instructions, half of the subjects took from the partitioned resource (sectioned 
areas of space) while half took from the nonpartitioned resource (a nonsectioned 
area of space). Finally, for half of the subjects in each of these conditions, the 
instructed or implied amount of the withdrawal was one-third, while the 
instructed or implied amount of the other half's withdrawal was one-twelfth of 
their resource. 
Materials. The resource used in the partitioned resource conditions of 
both the resource sharing and accuracy instructions were blocks of space. Six 
blocks of space (total area = 5766 square inches, block area = 961 square 
inches) were used in the one-third conditions. Due to facility constraints, the 
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area used in the one-twelfth condition was not large enough to allow for the same 
size blocks as in the one-third condition. The blocks were only slightly smaller 
(block area = 929 square inches) and 24 blocks of space (total area = 23064 
square inches) were used. Masking tape was used to designate the total area and 
the individual blocks in each condition. 
In the nonpartitioned condition, an area of 5766 square inches of space 
was used in the one-third conditions of both the resource sharing and accuracy 
instructions. An area of 22302 square inches of space was used in the one-
twelfth conditions of both the resource sharing and accuracy instructions. While 
these areas were designated by masking tape, they were not partitioned into 
individual blocks. 
The spatial areas used were lab rooms in an academic building. The 
subjects were given a ball of string to mark off the area they believed to be the 
accurate amount or the area they wished to take depending on their instruction 
condition. The subjects filled out the same questionnaire as in Study 1. 
Procedure. The subjects were read the instructions by the experimenter 
and given a chance to ask questions. The instructions were very similar to the 
instructions read in Study 1 with respect to the idea of accuracy or resource 
sharing. In the accuracy conditions, the subjects were either instructed to block 
off one-third or one-twelfth of the total area. Thus, if subjects were accurate, 
in the one-third accuracy conditions an area of 1922 square inches should have 
been blocked off while in the one-twelfth accuracy conditions an area of 1859 
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square inches should have been blocked off. The accurate withdrawal in the 
partitioned conditions was equal to two blocks of the resource. Prizes of $5 were 
awarded to the subject in each accuracy condition who blocked off closest to the 
instructed amount. In the partitioned accuracy conditions, one subject of those 
marking off the correct amount of space was chosen at random to receive the 
prize. 
Subjects in the resource sharing conditions were told that they were the 
first member of their group to withdraw from an amount of a resource and that 
the other members of their group would withdraw after them. In each of the one-
third conditions, the subject's equal share of the resource was 1922 square 
inches and in the one-twelfth conditions was 1859 square inches. The subject's 
equal share was equivalent to two blocks in the partitioned resource conditions. 
Subjects were told that one member of their group would be chosen at random and 
paid $2 for each entire square yard and, in the nonpartitioned conditions, a 
fraction of that amount for each partial square yard taken. In actuality, at the 
end of the experiment, one subject in each of the four conditions was chosen at 
random to receive a prize of $5. 
After the subjects marked an area using the string, they completed the 
questionnaire. After the subject had left the experiment, the area enclosed by the 
string was measured and recorded. The data for each subject was analyzed only if 
the subject accurately demonstrated an understanding of his or her instructions 
on the questionnaire. 
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Dependent variables. The main dependent variables are the actual and 
perceived amounts of space withdrawn. In each of the nonpartitioned conditions, 
the amounts withdrawn were divided by the area of an individual block in the 
corresponding partitioned conditions. By doing this, the amounts withdrawn in 
each condition could be perceived as comparable resource units. The number of 
resource units withdrawn was used in the analyses. The responses to the fun 
question were not used in this study. This question was designed specifically for 
Study 3 but was included on the questionnaires in each study to appear consistent. 
Results and Discussion 
An analysis to detect order effects was performed on the data collected in 
Study 2 and failed to reach any significant effects associated with order. As in 
Study 1, this finding shows that the position of the spatial resource in the overall 
experiment did not effect either the subjects' perceived or actual withdrawals. 
A 2 (partitionment: partitioned, nonpartitioned) X 2 (instruction: 
accuracy, sharing) X 2 (equality fraction: one-third, one-twelfth) X 2. (type of 
withdrawal: perceived, actual) between subjects analysis of variance with 
repeated measures on the final variable failed to reveal the predicted 4-way 
interaction, E (1, 82) = 1.71, P. = .19. The means of the experimental 
conditions are presented in Table 4. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------
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Subjects perceived they withdrew and actually withdrew close to the desired 
amount, two resource units, in the each condition of the accuracy instruction and 
in the one-third equality fraction conditions of the sharing instruction. In the 
one-twelfth sharing conditions, subjects withdrew half a resource unit to a 
whole resource unit more but the increase was not enough to bring the analysis to 
significance. 
The pattern in the one-twelfth, sharing conditions indicates that subjects 
were being deliberately greedy but the overestimation bias is not supported by 
the means in the larger resource conditions of the accuracy task. A slight 
overestimation is obvious when subjects shared the larger, nonpartitioned 
spatial resource but because the same overestimation is not found in the accuracy 
condition, it is possible that the subjects wrote down a smaller perceived amount 
taken than they truly believed had been withdrawn. Another possible reason for 
the high degree of accuracy was the size of the spatial resource. Due to facility 
constraints, the areas used in the study were fairly small. The area in the one-
third equality fraction was small enough the subjects could easily visualize one-
third of the area. In addition, many subjects in effect partitioned the resource 
with the string. By giving the subjects unlimited time to make their 
withdrawals, they were able to measure out an accurate space. Subjects in the 
sharing conditions did not take the time to measure out their withdrawals 
accounting for their slight overestimation when the larger nonpartitioned area 
was the resource. 
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None of the within subjects analyses reached significance. When the data 
were collapsed across type of withdrawal, the equality fraction by instruction 
analysis was found to be significant, E (1, 82) = 5.07, g, ~ .05. The means of 
the sharing (M = 2.01, sd = .37) and accuracy (M = 2.00, sd = .04) 
instructions in the one-third equality fractions condition are virtually equal. In 
the one-twelfth accuracy instruction condition, the mean is also virtually equal 
(M = 2.02, sd = .20). However, in the one-twelfth sharing condition, the mean 
increased by over two-thirds of a resource unit (M = 2.69, sd = 1.20) 
indicating that subjects were most likely to withdraw more of the resource when 
it was presented in a large amount and when accuracy was not the goal. Type of 
withdrawal does not significantly influence this interaction suggesting that 
subjects in this experiment are good estimaters of spatial amounts. The effect 
can be visualized in Figure 3. 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
When just the subjects' actual withdrawals were analyzed, a similar equality 
fraction by instruction interaction proved to be significant, E (1, 82} = 6.93, Jl 
s .01. This interaction shows that subjects actually took more when they were 
sharing a large amount of a resource. The pattern of means for this interaction is 
very similar to the graph of the means in the equality fraction by instruction 
interaction presented in Figure 3 and is, therefore, not presented. 
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A marginally significant instruction by partitionment interaction for 
subjects' perceived withdrawals (E (1, 82) = 3.70, Q. = .06) presents some 
interesting findings. The means of this interaction, presented in Table 5, 
indicate that subjects in the sharing conditions perceived they were taking more 
than the expected two resource units. This increase was more pronounced in the 
nonpartitioned condition which shows that while subjects perceived they were 
being greedy in the sharing conditions, they were more likely to exhibit greedy 
behavior when the resource was not easily divisible. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
These interactions are supported by two significant main effects. The 
main effect for equality fraction (E (1, 82) = 5.53, Q. :S .05) shows an increase 
in the number of mean resource units taken from 2.01 (sd = .29) in the one-
third condition to 2.40 (sd = .97) in the one-twelfth condition. This effect is 
also reflected in significant perceived (E {1, 82) = 5.50, Q. s .05) and actual (E 
(1, 82) = 10.77, Q. s .01) main effects for equality fraction, both of which have 
very similar means. Overall, these three effects combine to demonstrate an 
increase in withdrawal when a larger amount of the spatial resource was 
presented. The second main effect for instruction (E (1, 82) = 4.92, Q. s .05) 
shows a larger mean withdrawal in the sharing conditions (M = 2.31, sd = .90) 
than in the accuracy conditions (M = 2.01, sd = .14). This effect is similarly 
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reflected in significant perceived (E (1, 82) = 3.94, R ~ .OS) and actual (E (1, 
82) = 6.18, 12. ~ .OS) instruction main effects, both with comparable means. 
These effects show that subjects believed they withdrew and actually did 
withdraw more when they were sharing a resource than when they were 
accurately attempting to estimate an amount. 
Study 2 provides evidence of a deliberate greed in subjects' withdrawals 
of the larger shared resource. The overestimation bias is not strongly supported 
due to the ease with which accurate withdrawals could be made. 
Study 3: Temporal Resources 
While the goal of Study 3 is similar to the goals of the previous two 
studies, it involves a temporal resource. This study will compare differences 
between withdrawals due to group size, partitionment or nonpartitionment of a 
shared temporal resource, and amounts withdrawn when accuracy is the 
instruction. In this study, however, a fourth independent variable will be 
included in the design. The subjects will be assigned conditions varied by 
instruction, partitionment or nonpartitionment of temporal resource, fraction of 
equality, and enjoyability of the activity. Subjects will be given an activity to 
engage in while estimating an amount of time. Although the addition of the fourth 
condition is a deviation from the established methodology of the previous two 
studies, it is necessary to provide subjects with something to do during their 
time estimations because a temporal resource is the amount of time invested in 
the completion of a project or goal, not just the time itself (Jones, 1993}. 
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Hence, to make the instructions more realistic, an activity must be added to the 
study. 
Anticipated enjoyability of the activity is varied in order to determine if 
the enjoyability of the activity affects the amount of time consumed. In addition, 
the final question on the questionnaire will serve as a check to see if the 
activities designated as enjoyable and not enjoyable were viewed in the same 
manner by the subjects. It is expected that in the resource sharing instruction, 
subjects withdrawing from the partitioned resource will adopt the salient 
equality rule, as will subjects withdrawing from the smaller, nonpartitioned 
resource. When withdrawing from the larger nonpartitioned resource, a 
tendency to take more than one's fair share is expected due to deliberate greed and 
an inadvertent overestimation. The results of the accuracy instruction will 
likely show that the accurate withdrawal of partitioned resources is quite easy, 
but is subject to the overestimation bias when the resource is nonpartitioned and 
as the amount of the resource increases. By balancing the enjoyability of the 
activity across subjects, the type of activity is not expected to effect the results 
of the study. 
Methods 
Subjects. The same 90 subjects used in Study 1 and Study 2 also served 
as participants for Study 3. The experimental conditions were similar to those of 
Study 1 and Study 2, and the subjects served in the same experimental condition. 
In addition, half of the subjects served in each of the resource enjoyability 
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conditions 
Design. The experiment used a design similar to those found in Study 1 
and Study 2, a 2 (instruction: accuracy, resource sharing} X 2 (partitionment: 
partitioned, nonpartitioned} X 2 (equality fraction: one-third, one-twelfth} X 2 
(enjoyability: Tetris, questions} between subjects factorial design. Half of the 
subjects were told that they were participating in an accuracy of measurement 
task, while the other half were told that they were participating in a resource 
sharing task. In each of these instructions, half of the subjects took from the 
partitioned resource (sectioned amounts of time) while half will took from the 
nonpartitioned resource (a nonpartitioned amount of time}. For half of the 
subjects in each of these conditions, the instructed or implied amount of the time 
to be claimed was one-third, while the instructed or implied amount of time to be 
claimed by the other half was one-twelfth. Finally, half of the subjects were 
given a video game to play while estimating the temporal resource while the 
other half answered a set of questions. 
Materials. The resource used in the partitioned resource conditions of 
both the resource sharing and accuracy instructions were 1 minute blocks of 
time. Six blocks of time (total time = 6 minutes} were used in the one-third 
conditions while 24 blocks of time (total time = 24 minutes} were used in the 
one-twelfth conditions. 
In the partitioned time conditions, the experimenter verbally signaled the 
passage of a 1 minute block of time. In the nonpartitioned conditions, the subject 
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had no indication of the amount of time that was passing. During the temporal 
estimations, the subjects in the video game conditions played the game Tetris. 
The game was set on level three because, when set on this low difficulty level, a 
single game may be played for an almost indefinite amount of time. The subjects 
in the question condition were given a lengthy set of questions to work on while 
estimating time. The number and difficulty of the questions in both the one-third 
and one-twelfth conditions was set so that the subjects could not finish in under 
two minutes. 
The subjects completed the same questionnaire as in Study 1 and Study 2. 
The experimenter used a stopwatch to measure the amount of time indicated by 
the subject to the nearest second. 
Procedure. The instructions read to the subjects were, again, similar to 
those used in the first two studies with respect to either sharing a common 
resource or attempting to withdraw an accurate amount. During this study, the 
subjects either played a video game, Tetris, or answered questions as part of 
their task. 
In the accuracy conditions, subjects were instructed to indicate verbally 
when either one-third or one-twelfth of the total time block had elapsed. The 
accurate estimate of time in the accuracy conditions was 2 minutes {two of the 1 
minute blocks of time). Prizes of $5 were awarded to the subject in each 
accuracy condition who indicated closest to the instructed amount. In the 
partitioned accuracy conditions, one subject of those indicating the correct 
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amount of time was chosen at random to receive the prize. 
The subjects in the resource sharing conditions were told that they were 
the first member in their group of 3 or 12 to claim portions of playing time and 
that the other members of their group would be claiming amounts of time after 
them. In each condition, the subject's equal share of the resource based on the 
number of members in the group and the total amount of time available was 2 
minutes. Subjects were told that one member of their group would be chosen at 
random and paid $2 for each 1 minute block claimed and, in the nonpartitioned 
conditions, a fraction of that amount for each partial block of time claimed. In 
actuality, at the end of the experiment one subject in each of the four conditions 
was chosen at random to receive a prize of $5. 
The subject then completed the questionnaire used in both Study 1 and 
Study 2. The amount of time that the subject either indicated as the accurate 
amount or claimed as their own was recorded after the subject had left the 
experiment. 
Dependent variables. The main dependent variables are the actual and 
perceived amounts of space withdrawn. In each of the nonpartitioned conditions, 
the amounts withdrawn were divided by sixty, the number of seconds in a minute. 
Sixty seconds constituted one block of time in the partitioned resource conditions. 
By dividing the nonpartitioned withdrawals, the amounts withdrawn in each 
condition could be perceived as comparable resource units. The number of 
resource units withdrawn was used in the analyses. The responses to the fun 
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question were used to determine if the subjects' enjoyment of their activity 
caused them to withdraw a larger portion of the resource than in the other 
activity condition. 
Results and Discussion 
An analysis to detect order effects was performed on the data collected in 
Study 3 and failed to reach any significant effects associated with order. This 
shows, as in Study 1 and Study 2, that the order in which the resource were 
presented to the subjects did not effect their perceived or actual withdrawals of 
the resource units. 
A 2 (partitionment: partitioned, nonpartitioned) X 2 (instruction: 
accuracy, sharing) X 2 (equality fraction: one-third, one-twelfth) X 2. (type of 
withdrawal: perceived, actual) between subjects analysis of variance with 
repeated measures on the final variable failed to reveal the predicted 4-way 
interaction, E (1, 82) = .42, Q = .52. The pattern of means presented in Table 6 
shows that subjects were fairly accurate in their attempts to withdraw two 
resource units in each of the accuracy conditions and perceived to withdraw 
amounts quite similar to their actual withdrawals. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
In the sharing conditions, subjects withdrew more of the temporal resource, 
especially in the one-twelfth nonpartitioned condition. In this condition, 
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subjects withdrew three times their fair share of the temporal resource and 
fairly accurately acknowledged doing so. However, subjects sharing a smaller 
amount of nonpartitioned time perceived themselves to be somewhat greedy and 
displayed the overestimation bias. 
In Study 3, a fourth independent condition was added to the design. 
Enjoyability of resource was added because what can be done with an amount of 
time, more so than the time entity itself, is valuable (Jones, 1993}. An analysis 
of variance was performed on subjects indications of their enjoyability of the 
temporal resource. The analysis yielded a significant difference (E (1, 88) = 
26.92, Q. :5 .001) indicating that subjects enjoyed playing Tetris (M = 5.71, sd 
= 1.1 0) more than they did answering questions (M = 4.97, sd = 1.55) while 
estimating time. 
It was then questioned whether or not the enjoyment of the temporal 
resource would effect subjects' perceived and actual withdrawals. An analysis of 
variance was performed on the types of withdrawal adding enjoyability of 
resource as a fourth independent variable. The analysis did not yield any 
significant results indicating that while Tetris may have caused subjects to enjoy 
their participation in the experiment, it did not cause them to withdraw more 
than those subjects who answered questions. In fact, the questions did not 
produce the desired low fun rating. The fun mean for the questions fell above the 
median of the scale used. This may, in part, account for the greed found in all of 
the sharing conditions. Subjects enjoyment of the resource may have outweighed 
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the salience of the equality rule. Without an incentive to stop playing or working 
on their activity, as was provided in the accuracy condition, subjects may have 
continued knowing, somewhat, the extent to which they were being greedy. 
As in Study 2, the analyses on the within subjects withdrawals of the 
temporal resource did not prove to be significant. There are, however, many 
significant effects to report. Collapsed across type of withdrawal, the 
partitionment by instruction interaction was found to be significant, E (1, 82) 
= 6.96, Q. ::; .01. When sharing a nonpartitioned amount of time, subjects took a 
mean of 4.44 resource units (sd = 3.50) while taking a mean of 2.42 {sd = 
.78), two resource units less, when the resource was partitioned . Subjects took 
the desired amount in both the partitioned (M = 2.00, sd = .00) and 
nonpartitioned (M = 2.08, sd = .42) accuracy conditions. The effect may be 
visualized in Figure 4. 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
This effect is reflected in significant partitionment by instruction interactions 
resulting for analyses of perceived (E (1, 82) = 7.36, Q. :5 .01) and actual (E 
(1, 82) = 5.22, Q. ::; .05) withdrawals of the temporal resource. The patterns of 
means for both of these interactions are very similar to that presented in Figure 
4 and, therefore, are not presented. Together, these significant interactions 
show that subjects were far more likely to take a large amount of a shared 
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nonpartitioned resource than a shared partitioned resource and to be aware of 
their greedy actions. This finding also supports the existence of a deliberate 
greed when sharing a nonpartitioned temporal resource. 
Subjects also perceived that other factors affected their withdrawals, 
although, in actuality they did not appear to. Further analyses of subjects' 
perceived withdrawals yielded a significant pa~itionment by equality fraction 
interaction (E (1, 82) = 5.92, ll ::; .05) and a significant equality fraction by 
instruction interaction, E (1, 82) = 8.32, J2 ::; .01. The means of the 
partitionment by equality fraction interaction indicate that subjects perceived 
they took more in the one-twelfth, nonpartitioned condition (M = 4.15, sd = 
3.71) than in the one-third, nonpartitioned condition (M = 2.57, sd = 1.19), 
or in either the one-third (M = 2.17, sd = .51) or one-twelfth (M = 2.39, sd = 
.78) partitioned conditions. This indicates an unfulfilled motive of deliberate 
greed on the part of the subjects withdrawing from the larger, nonpartitioned 
temporal resource. The effect may be visualized in Figure 5. 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
The means associated with the equality fraction by instruction interaction show 
that subjects perceived they withdrew more when sharing a large amount of a 
temporal resource (M = 4.44, sd = 3.60} than a smaller amount (M = 2.67, sd 
= 1.21) or when attempting to accurately withdraw one-third (M = 2.01, sd = 
When the Equality 35 
.04) and one-twelfth (M = 2.00, sd = .00) of the resource. The effect may be 
visualized in Figure 6. 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
This interaction also suggests that subjects perceived they were being greedy in 
their withdrawals when sharing a large amount of a resource. 
The three significant interactions on subjects perceived temporal 
withdrawals are somewhat qualified by a marginally significant equality fraction 
by partitionment by instruction interaction, E (1, 82} = 3.67, J2 = .06. The 
means of this interaction are presented in Table 7 and indicate that subjects 
attempted to withdraw an amount of the temporal resource according to different 
criteria when they believed that were sharing the resource than when they were 
asked to accurately estimate an amount. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
Finally, the interactions are supported by three significant main effects. 
Each of the effects is significant when collapsed across perceived and actual 
withdrawals, and when the perceived and actual withdrawals were analyzed 
separately. The main effect for equality fraction on the collapsed data (E (1, 82} 
= 4.66, J2 :::;;; .05) indicates that subjects withdrew more when the resource was 
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large (M = 3.46, sd = 3.13) than when it was smaller (M = 2.50, sd = 1.06). 
This is consistent with the patterns found in the means of the perceived effect (E 
(1, 82) = 9.12, 1l ~ .01) and the actual effect, E (1, 82) = 5.64, 1l ~ .05. The 
main effect for partitionment on the collapsed data (E (1, 82) = 8.00, J2$; .01) 
shows that subjects took more from a nonpartitioned temporal resource (M = 
3.39, sd = 2.86) than a partitioned temporal resource (M = 2.28, sd = .66). 
The means associated with the perceived withdrawal effect (E (1, 82) = 10.53 1l 
~ .01) and the actual withdrawal effect (E (1, 82) = 9.49, J2 :s; .01) are 
consistent with those of the means of the collapsed effect. The main effect for 
instruction on the collapsed data (E (1, 82) = 13.03, 1l :s; .01) indicates that 
subjects took more of the resource when they believed they were sharing it with 
others (M = 3.54, sd = 2.83) than when they were accurately attempting to 
withdraw a specific amount (M = 2.05, sd = .34). The means of the perceived 
withdrawal effect (f (1, 82) = 18.64, 1l $; .01) and the actual withdrawal effect 
(£ (1, 82} = 13.08, 1l ~ .01} are consistent with the pattern of means shown in 
this effect. 
Study 3 provides strong support for the existence of deliberate greed in 
the subjects' withdrawals and some support for the overestimation bias. 
However, when sharing the temporal resource, the violation of the equality rule 
in the larger, nonpartitioned resource condition does not appear to be the results 
of the overestimation bias found in the corresponding accuracy condition. In the 
smaller nonpartitioned resource condition, an overestimation bias appears when 
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the subjects shared the resource but this finding is not supported by an 
overestimation bias in the corresponding accuracy condition. These discrepant 
findings limit the interpretation of the overestimation bias in the consumption of 
temporal resources. 
General Discussion 
The goal of this experiment was to extend crevious research on resource 
consumption to new types of resources: spatial and temporal. The findings of 
each individual study provide some support of a deliberate greed motive and an 
inadvertent overestimation bias in the withdrawals of shared resources. A 
comparison of subjects' withdrawals in each resource condition suggests that 
different types of resources are not necessarily shared in the same manner. 
However, these differential consumption may be due to the methodology of the 
experiment. Changes made in portions of the methodology may alter the results. 
Of primary concern is the perceived value of the monetary incentives 
offered versus the value of consuming the actual resource. Alone, the incentive 
offered for the shared resources was not enough to override the equality 
heuristic. The value of the resource itself may come into play. In the physical 
resource study, as previously mentioned, a small monetary incentive may not 
have overriden the subjects' distaste for a large box of fairly dirty sand. By 
offering subjects gloves to use when making their withdrawals, this concern 
would be addressed without offering a physical withdrawing device (e.g. shovel) 
that could serve as a measuring heuristic. 
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In the temporal resource study, the monetary incentive in conjunction 
with an enjoyment of the activity may account for the violation of the equality 
rule in each of the sharing conditions. The subjects indicated that they enjoyed 
both Tetris and answering the questions. The questions were intended to be an 
unpleasant activity and it is possible that a truly unpleasant activity given to half 
of the subjects would lower the mean of the shared, nonpartitioned, one-twelfth 
equality fraction condition. In this experiment, since subjects served in the 
same experimental conditions throughout the experiment and order effects were 
non-significant, the means show that subjects sharing a large nonpartitioned 
resource may have valued the resources quite differently to account for their 
fluctuating withdrawals. The value of the temporal resource may have increased 
the temptation to withdraw and, as Allison & Messick (1990) found, when 
tempted, subjects will violate the equality rule. Asking subjects how much they 
value the resource from which they have just withdrawn would be a question to 
add to the subjects' questionnaire. 
In Study 2, the spatial resource provided many confounds. Primarily, the 
size of the larger spatial resource was too small. The area was small enough that 
subjects could fairly accurately visualize where to place the string indicating one-
twelfth of the area. In addition, the string served as a measuring heuristic which 
aided the subjects in their accuracy. Replicators of this study would want to use 
a much larger spatial area and avoid letting subjects use the string as a 
measuring device. One possible way to avoid this is by having the experimenter 
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hold the string and have the subjects indicate where they would like it placed. 
Another concern, one which has not been addressed by previous 
researchers (Allison & Messick, 1990; Allison, et al., 1992), is whether or 
not the subjects in the partitioned sharing conditions actually believe that their 
withdrawals are verifiable. Or, in effect, is the equality rule the main limitation 
of their withdrawals. By either telling the subjects they would be identified to 
their next group member or remain completely anonymous, this could be 
manipulated. In this experiment, subjects were told merely that they were the 
first member in their group to withdraw. This indicates that the next group 
member would see the amount left by the first subject but does not indicate that 
he or she would know who the first subject was. 
Other interesting manipulations would be to look at individual differences 
in relation to how different types of people share resource. McClintock & Allison 
(1989) studied how cooperaters, individualists, and competitors decided to 
contribute time to a worthy cause. By including this type of manipulation, 
consumption rather than contribution by differing individual personality types 
could be assessed. A final manipulation would be to assess subjects attitudes 
about resource conservation prior to their participation in the experiment. It 
has been shown that their is no relationship between conservation attitudes and 
personal conservation practices (Costanzo et al., 1986; Edney, 1980} but 
questioning subjects about their attitudes immediately preceding their 
participation could increase the salience of the equality rule. 
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Once the methodological concerns of this experiment are addressed, it 
would be possible to run an analysis including type of resource as an independent 
variable. This would provide more insight into whether or not the consumption 
of different resources is determined by the same criteria. If resources are 
shared in the same manner, than further research may target how to make the 
equality rule more salient. However, if resources are not shared in the same 
fashion, the study of shared spatial and temporal resources must increase or 
indeed, the deliberate greed found here in the consumption of shared resources, 
will lead the world resource supply to a "tragedy of the commons." 
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Table 1 
Mean Percieved and Actual Physical Resource Units Withdrawn as a function of 
Instruction. Eguality fraction. and Partitionment 
Instruction 
Sharing Accuracy 
fraction Partitioned Non Partitioned Partitioned Non Partitioned 
One-Third 2.17 2.28 2.00 2.00 
(I 72) (1.02) (I 0 0) (I 00) 
2.17 2.31 2.00 1.98 
{. 7 2) {1.11) (. 0 0) (. 2 2) 
One-Twelfth 3.00 1.49 2.00 2.00 
(1.76) (. 8 7) (. 00) (. 00) 
3. 00 2 I 1 3 2.00 3.02 
(1.76) (1 .20) (. 0 0) (1.94) 
NQ.le.. The numbers in normal type represent mean perceived resource units withdrawn. 
The numbers in bold type represent mean actual resource units withdrawn. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 2 
Mean Perceived and Actual Physical Resource Units Withdrawn as a Function of 
Equality Fraction and Partitionment 
Partitionment 
Fraction Partitioned Non Partitioned 
One-Third 2.11 2.17 
(.58} (. 79} 
2. 11 2.1 8 
(.58) (. 8 7) 
One-Twelfth 2.67 1.75 
(1.50} (. 65) 
2. 67 2.57 
(1 .50) (1.64) 
~- The numbers in normal type represent mean perceived resource units 
withdrawn. The numbers in bold type represent mean actual resource units 
withdrawn. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 3 
Mean Physical Resource Units Withdrawn as a Function of Instruction. Eguality 
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Table 4 
Mean Perceived and Actual Spatial Resource Units Withdrawn as a Function of 
jnstruction. Eguality Fraction. and Partitionment 
Instruction 
Sharing Accuracy 
Fraction Partitioned Non Partitioned Partitioned Non Partitioned 
One-Third 1.92 2.08 2.00 2.00 
(I 2 9) (I 35) (I 0 0) (I 00) 
1.92 2.07 2.00 2.00 
(I 2 9) (! 4 8} (I 0 0} (. 0 9) 
One-Twelfth 2.50 2.62 2.00 2.00 
(1.00) (1.40) (I 0 0) (. 0 0} 
2.50 3.13 2.00 2.06 
(1.00) (1 .54) (. 0 0) (. 4 9) 
~. The numbers in normal type represent mean perceived resource units withdrawn. 
The numbers in bold type represent mean actual resource units withdrawn. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 5 
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Table 6 
Mean Perceived and Actual Temporal Resource Units Withdrawn as a Function of 
Instruction. Equality Fraction. and Partitionment 
Instruction 
Sharing Accuracy 
Fraction Partitioned Non Partitioned Partitioned Non Partitioned 
One-Third 2.25 2.94 2.00 2.01 
(I 62) (1.43) (.0 0) ( .05) 
2.25 3.40 2.00 1.96 
(. 6 2) (1 .66) (. 0 0) (. 4 7) 
One-Twelfth 2.58 6.29 2.00 2.00 
(. 9 0) (4.33) (. 00) {. 00) 
2.58 6.42 2.00 2.35 
(. 9 0) (5.53) (. 0 0) (1.07) 
~. The numbers in normal type represent mean perceived resource units withdrawn. 
The numbers in bold type represent mean actual resource units withdrawn. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 7 
Mean Perceived Temporal Resource Units Withdrawn as a Function of Instruction. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Mean perceived and actual physical resource units withdrawn as a 
function of equality fraction. 
Figure 2. Mean perceived and actual physical resource units withdrawn as a 
function of partitionment. 
figure 3. Mean spatial resource units withdrawn as a function of equality 
fraction and instruction. 
figure 4. Mean temporal resource units withdrawn as a function of 
partitionment and instruction. 
figure 5. Mean perceived temporal resource units withdrawn as a function of 
partitionment and equality fraction. 
Figure 6. Mean perceived temporal resource units withdrawn as a function of 
equality fraction and instruction. 
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